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Abstract 
In order to cover their CO2 emissions, power companies receive most of the required EU ETS 
allowances for free. In line with economic theory, these companies pass on the costs of these 
allowances to the price of electricity. This paper analyses the implications of the EU ETS for 
the power sector, notably the impact of free allocation of CO2 emission allowances on the 
price of electricity and the profitability of power generation. Besides some theoretical 
reflections, the paper presents empirical and model estimates of CO2 cost pass through, 
indicating that pass through rates vary between 40 and 100 percent of CO2 costs, or – in 
absolute terms – between 3 and 18 €/MWh, depending on the carbon intensity of the marginal 
production unit and other, market or technology specific factors concerned. As a result, power 
companies realise substantial windfall profits, indicated by empirical and model estimates 
presented in the paper. In order to avoid these windfall profits, the paper concludes that free 
allocation to power companies should be phased out in favour of auctioning. 
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1. Introduction 
A major characteristic of the present EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is that almost all 
CO2 allowances are allocated for free to the installations covered by the scheme. During the 
first phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007), more than 2.2 billion allowances of 1 tonne each are 
allocated per year (EC, 2005). At average market prices for 2005 (i.e. about 26 €/tCO2 , this 
represents a social value of approximately € 40 billion per annum, about 60 percent of which 
is allocated to the power sector. 
 
Against this background, the present paper analyses the implications of the EU ETS for the 
power sector, notably the impact of free allocation of CO2 emission allowances on the price of 
electricity and the profitability of power generation. First of all, Section 2 discusses the effect 
of different generation technologies being used to generate electricity. How does the 
internalisation of CO2 allowance prices by individual generators into their bids feed through 
to the power price and how does this in turn effect profitability? Subsequently, Sections 3 to 5 
present empirical and model findings on passing through costs of CO2 emission allowances to 
power prices in countries of North-western Europe and the implications for the profitability of 
power production in these countries at the national and firm level. Finally, the paper 
concludes with a brief summary of the major findings and policy implications. 
 
2. Theory 
The EU ETS is a cap and trade system based primarily on a free allocation of a fixed amount 
of emission allowances to a set of covered installations. Companies can either use these 
allowances to cover the emissions resulting from the production of these installations or sell 
them on the market (to other companies that need additional allowances (Reinaud, 2005)). 
Hence, for a company using an emission allowance represents an opportunity cost, regardless 
whether the allowances are allocated for free or purchased at an auction or market. Therefore, 
in principle and in line with economic theory, a company is expected to add the costs of CO2 
emission allowances to its other marginal (variable) costs when making (short-term) 
production or trading decisions, even if the allowances are granted for free (Burtraw, Palmer 
et al., 2002; Reinaud, 2003; Burtraw, Palmer et al., 2005).  
 
Different generation technologies produce different levels of CO2 emissions, and therefore the 
opportunity costs of CO2 emissions per unit of power produced differ as well. For example, a 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine produces about 0.48 tonnes of CO2 per MWh of electricity, 
while a typical coal power station emits about 0.85 tCO2/MWh. A CO2 price of 20 €/tCO2, 
therefore, increases the generation costs for the gas plant by 9.6 €/MWh and for the coal plant 
by 17 €/MWh.  
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During a certain load period, the competitive electricity price is only affected by the price 
increase of the marginal production unit. This can be illustrated by a marginal cost (price) 
duration curve, as presented in Figure 1. On the X-axis the 8760 hours of a year are depicted, 
sorted in descending order of the marginal system costs. The Y-axis gives the marginal costs 
of the marginal generation unit. The competitive electricity price in any one hour is affected 
by the cap and trade system through the price increase of the marginal unit. Hence, the 
amount at which the power price increases due to the passing through of CO2 costs may differ 
per hour or load period considered, depending on the marginal generation unit concerned. As 
a consequence, the CO2 costs pass through is defined as the average increase in power price 
over a certain period due to the increase in the CO2 price of an emission allowance.  
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Figure 1 Pass through of CO2 opportunity costs for different load periods (at a price of 20 €/tCO2) 
 
We represent the difference between the behaviour of individual generators and the impact on 
the system price by defining the ‘add-on’ and the ‘work-on’ rate. In a competitive 
environment, generators ‘add-on’ the opportunity costs of CO2 allowances to the power price. 
The increase of the bid of the marginal unit will then determine how much of the CO2 
allowance prices are ‘worked-on’ the electricity price. However, in a liberalised market, 
prices are ultimately determined by a complex set of market forces. As a result, the work-on 
rate may be lower than the add-on rate. 
 
One reason why the work-on rate may be lower than the add-on rate is market demand 
response. If higher power prices reduce electricity demand, then an expensive power station 
might not need to operate and a cheaper generator will set the marginal price. The change in 
power price is smaller than the change in marginal costs due to emissions trading. Hence, 
while the add-on rate will remain 100 percent, the work-on rate will be lower than 100 
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percent. However, price response is typically rather low for households and other small-scale 
consumers of electricity, but may be more significant for major end-users such as the power-
intensive industries. Power-intensive industry would substitute electricity purchases with self-
generation of electricity. This pathway is less attractive, as the EU ETS also covers large-
scale self-generation by industry and, therefore, faces similar cost increases, thus reducing 
demand response of power-intensive industry. Nevertheless, through self-generation power-
intensive industry would benefit from the economic rent due to the transfer of valuable, freely 
allocated assets. 
 
The extent to which carbon costs are passed through to power prices depends also on changes 
in the merit order of the supply curve due to emissions trading. This can be illustrated by 
Figure 2, where the supply curve is characterised by a step function with two types of 
technologies - A and B. The vertical dash line indicates the fixed demand. In the left part of 
Figure 2, when there is no change in the merit order, the change in the power price (Δp2) will 
always be equal to the marginal CO2 allowances costs of the marginal generation technology 
B. The resulting pass-through rate will always be unity (in terms of both the add-on rate and 
the work-on rate). However, when there is a switch in the merit order - as displayed in the 
right part of Figure 2, the situation becomes different. In this case, the marginal technology is 
A with CO2 allowances costs equal to Δp3 while the change in the power price is Δp4. 
Therefore, while the add-on rate for the marginal production technology A is 100 percent, the 
work-on rate Δp4 /Δp3, will be less than 1 since Δp4 < Δp3.2 In markets with surplus capacity, 
competitive pressures from excess generation capacity also impact the merit order and in turn, 
the work-on rate (Reinaud, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 2 Pass-through rates under changes in the merit order 
 
                                                 
2  Model analyses show that when CO2 costs exceeds 20 €/tonne, emissions trading would induce substantial 
changes in the production merit order (Sijm et al., 2005).  
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In addition, there may be several reasons why generators do not add on the full CO2 costs to 
their power bid prices:3 
• The expectation of power producers that their current emissions or output will be used as 
an input factor for the determination of the allocation of allowances in future periods, 
mainly after 2012 but possibly even 2008-2012. This creates an incentive to increase 
today’s output and thus induces generators to not add on the full allowance price to their 
energy bids.  
• Voluntary agreements or the regulatory threat of governments to intervene in the market if 
generators make excessive windfall profits from the free allocation might induce 
generators to limit the add-on. 
• Other reasons such as the incidence of non-optimal behaviour among power producers, 
market imperfections, time lags or other constraints, including the incidence of risks, 
uncertainties, lack of information, and the immaturity or lack of transparency of the 
carbon market. 
 
The impact on generators’ profits 
An important question is how the pass through of CO2 opportunity costs affects the 
profitability of power stations. The main purpose of free allocation of emissions allowances 
under the US cap and trade programmes for SO2 and NOx as well as under the EU ETS for 
CO2 is to obtain the political support of large emitters. Thus, the free allocation aims to ensure 
that the introduction of the ETS does not reduce profitability of the eligible companies.   
 
The impact of emissions trading in general and free allocation of emission allowances in 
particular can be illustrated by means of Figure 2. This figure illustrates the implications of 
emissions trading for generators profits in case the supply curve consists of different types of 
technology. In case emissions trading does not lead to a change in the merit order of the 
supply curve (and in total demand; see left hand side of Figure 2), the change in the power 
price (Δp2) is just equal to the CO2 costs per MWh of the marginal production unit (B). For 
this unit, this implies that profits do not change in case all the allowances have to be bought, 
while it results in windfall profits in case of full grandfathering (equal to Δp2 times volume 
produced).  
 
For the infra-marginal unit, however, the impact of emissions trading on operational profits 
does not only depend on the degree of grandfathering but also on whether it is more or less 
carbon-intensive than the marginal unit. If it is less carbon-intensive, it benefits from the fact 
that the ET-induced increase in power price is higher than the increase in its carbon costs per 
MWh. However, if the infra-marginal unit is more carbon-intensive than the marginal unit, it 
                                                 
3  For a full discussion and illustration of these reasons, see Chapter 4 of Sijm et al. (2005). 
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suffers from a loss, as the increase in power price is lower than the increase in its carbon costs 
per MWh, notably if allowances have to be bought on the market. Therefore, in the latter case, 
some grandfathering to this infra-marginal unit may be justified to break even, depending on 
the relative carbon-intensity of this unit. 
 
On the other hand, if emissions trading leads to a change in the merit order (while total 
demand remains the same; see the right part of Figure 2), the change in the power price (Δp4) 
is lower than the change in the CO2 costs per MWh of the marginal production unit (A). For 
this unit, emissions trading results in a windfall profit per MWh (equal to Δp4) in case of free 
allocation, but in a windfall loss (equal to Δp3 – Δp4) if all the allowances have to be bought. 
Therefore, for this situation/unit, some grandfathering may be justified to break even.4 For the 
infra-marginal unit (B), the increase in power price is higher than the increase in CO2 costs, 
regardless of whether allowances have to be bought or not. Therefore, even if this unit has to 
buy all its allowances, it will benefit from a windfall profit and, hence, there is no need for 
any grandfathering to this unit to break-even.5 
 
If electricity demand response to ET-induced price increases is sufficiently large to stop the 
operation of a set of power generators with higher variable costs and thus the market clearing 
price of electricity is reduced to the variable costs of a technology with lower variable costs, 
this will reduce the profits of all units operating during this period, as all of them will receive 
revenues corresponding to the lower market clearing price. 
 
3. Empirical estimates of passing through CO2 costs 
This section presents some empirically estimated rates of passing through CO2 opportunity 
costs of EU emissions trading to power prices in Germany and the Netherlands. We use two 
different approaches to estimate these rates. First, we look at the forward power market, 
particularly the year ahead market where, for instance, electricity delivered in 2006 is traded 
during every day of the year 2005. In this approach, we assess the extent to which changes in 
forward power prices can be explained by changes in underlying forward prices for fuel and 
CO2 allowances.  Secondly, we study the spot market, notably the German power exchange 
(EEX), by comparing hourly spot electricity prices for the period January 2005 till March 
2006 with the corresponding hourly electricity prices in the year 2004. More specifically, we 
look to what extent a change in the spot power price, for example at 9am on the first Monday 
                                                 
4  It should be observed, however, that the change in the merit order might occur only during a certain load 
period. This has to be accounted for when analysing the impact of emissions trading on firms’ profits and the 
implications for assessing the extent of grandfathering to break even. 
5  Similar findings can be derived by means of Figure 1, showing different types of technology along the load 
duration curve. By comparing the revenues (price/MWh * hours loaded) and the corresponding 
real/opportunity costs with and without emissions trading, changes in profits can be derived for different 
types of technology, including a change in the merit order of these technologies.  
 8
in January 2006 relative to the first Monday in January 2004, can be explained by a change in 
the price of a CO2 allowance on the EUA market.  
 
First of all, however, some background information will be provided on trends in prices, 
fuel/CO2 costs and dark/spark spreads in the power sector of Germany and the Netherlands 
during the years 2004-2005. 
 
Trends in forward prices and costs 
For the years 2004-05, Figures 3 and 4 present power prices versus fuel/CO2 costs to generate 
a MWh of power (assuming a fuel efficiency of 40 percent for coal and 42 percent for gas, a 
related emission factor of 0.85 and 0.48 tCO2/MWh for coal and gas, respectively, and full 
‘opportunity’ costs for generating electricity by either coal or gas). While Figure 3 covers the 
case of coal-generated off-peak power in Germany, Figure 4 presents the case of gas-
generated peak power in the Netherlands.6 
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Figure 3 Off-peak power prices versus fuel/CO2 costs in Germany (year ahead, 2004-2005) 
 
                                                 
6  In this section, unless otherwise stated, coal refers to the internationally traded commodity classified as coal 
ARA CIF AP#2, while gas refers to the high caloric gas (35,17) from the Dutch Gas Union Trade & Supply 
(GUTS). Moreover, prices for power, fuels and CO2 refer to forward markets (i.e. year-ahead prices).  
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Figure 4 Peak power prices versus fuel/CO2 costs in the Netherlands (year ahead, 2004-2005) 
 
The German case shows that the fuel (i.e. coal) costs to generate power have been more or 
less stable at a level of about 16 €/MWh during the years 2004-2005. In addition, CO2 costs 
of coal-generated power have been stable during the second part of 2004 but have 
approximately trebled during the first part of 2005 from about 6 €/MWh in January to some 
18 €/MWh in July. This suggests that the increasing off-peak prices in Germany over this 
period may have been caused primarily by the rising CO2 prices (and not by higher fuel 
prices). However, during the second part of 2005 (August-December 2005) CO2 costs per 
coal-generated MWh have been rather stable while off-peak prices have continued to rise. 
This indicates factors other than fuel and CO2 costs influence power prices. 
 
The Dutch case illustrates that the fuel (i.e. gas) costs to produce electricity have risen 
substantially from some 33 €/MWh in early January 2005 to about 56 €/MWh in early 
September 2005. CO2 costs of gas-generated power have also increased over this period, but 
less dramatically, i.e. from 4 to 11 €/MWh (partly due to the relatively low - but constant - 
emission factor of gas-generated electricity). This suggests, hence, that besides the CO2 cost 
pass through the rising peak load prices in the Netherlands over this period - from about 52 to 
80 €/MWh - are largely due to other factors, especially the rising gas prices. However, 
comparable to the German case, whereas both gas and CO2 costs have been more or less 
stable during the last quarter of 2005 (or even declined a bit as far as gas costs are concerned), 
peak power prices continued to increase to 84 €/MWh in late December 2005. 
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Trends in dark and spark spreads on forward markets 
Figures 5 and 6 present trends in dark/spark spreads and CO2 costs per MWh over the years 
2004-2005 in Germany and the Netherlands, based on forward (i.e. year ahead) prices for 
power, fuels and CO2 emission allowances. For the present analysis, a dark spread is simply 
defined as the difference between the power price and the cost of coal to generate a MWh of 
electricity, while a spark spread refers to the difference between the power price and the costs 
of gas to produce a MWh of electricity. If the costs of CO2 are included, these indicators are 
called ‘clean dark/spark spreads’ or ‘carbon compensated dark/spark spreads’.7 
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Figure 5  Trends in dark spreads and CO2 costs per coal-generated MWh in Germany during peak and 
off-peak hours (year ahead, 2004-2005) 
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Figure 6 Trends in spark/dark spreads and CO2 costs per gas/coal-generated MWh in the Netherlands 
during peak and off-peak hours (year ahead, 2004-2005) 
 
For Germany, Figure 5 depicts trends in dark spreads in both peak and off-peak hours, based 
                                                 
7  These spreads are indicators for the coverage of other (non-fuel/CO2) costs of generating electricity, 
including profits. For the present analysis, however, these other costs - for instance capital costs, maintenance 
or operating costs - are ignored as, for each specific case, they are assumed to be constant for the (short-term) 
period considered - although they may vary per case considered - and, hence, they do not affect the estimated 
pass-through rates. 
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on the assumption that a coal generator is the price-setting unit during these periods.8 In 
addition, it shows the costs of CO2 allowances required to cover the emissions per MWh 
generated by a coal-fired power plant (with an emission factor of 0.85 tCO2/MWh). The 
figure suggests that up to July 2005 changes in the dark spread can be largely explained by 
changes in the CO2 costs per MWh. Since August 2005, however, this relationship is less 
clear as the CO2 costs have remained more or less stable, while the dark spreads have 
continued to increase rapidly. 
 
For the Netherlands, Figure 6 depicts trends in the spark spread during the peak hours and the 
dark spread during the off-peak hours, based on the assumption that a gas- versus coal-fired 
installation is the price-setting unit during these periods, respectively. In addition, it presents 
the costs of CO2 allowances to cover the emissions per MWh produced by a gas- and coal-
fired power station, with an emission factor of 0.48 and 0.85 tCO2/MWh, respectively. 
Similar to the German case, Figure 7 suggests that, during the period January-July 2005, 
changes in the dark/spark spreads in the Netherlands can be largely attributed to changes in 
the CO2 costs per MWh, but that afterwards this relationship is less clear.  
 
Statistical estimates of CO2 cost pass through rates on forward markets 
Below, we provide empirical estimates of pass through rates of CO2 emissions trading costs to 
forward power prices in Germany and the Netherlands for the period January-December 2005.  
The basic assumption of estimating CO2 cost pass through rates is that during the observation 
period the dynamics of the power prices in Germany and the Netherlands can be fully 
explained by the variations in the fuel and CO2 costs over this period (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Hence, it is assumed that during this period other costs, for instance operational or 
maintenance costs, are constant and that the market structure did not alter over this period (i.e. 
changes in power prices can not be attributed to changes in technology, market power or other 
supply-demand relationships).  
 
Based on these assumptions, the relationship between power prices (P), fuel costs (F) and CO2 
costs is expressed by equation (1), where superscripts c and g indicate coal and gas, 
respectively. Likewise, the term CO2t is the CO2 cost associated with coal and gas at time t. 
Thus, it is equal to the product of the CO2 allowances price at time t and the time-invariant 
CO2 emission rate of coal or gas generators.  In our analysis, fuel costs are assumed to be 
fully passed on to power prices.9 This is equivalent to fixing the coefficient β2 at unity.  
 
                                                 
8  It is acknowledged, however, that during certain periods of the peak hours - the ‘super peak’ - a gas generator 
is the marginal (price-setting) unit, but due to lack of data, it is not possible to analyse the super peak period 
in Germany separately.  
9  In Sijm et al. (2006), this assumption was dropped, but it turned out that the estimated pass through rates for 
fuel and CO2 costs were unreliable due to the observation that fuel and CO2 costs are highly correlated.  
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By defining Yt as the difference between power price and fuel cost, equation (2) becomes the 
central regression equation of which the coefficient β1 has been estimated. In fact, Yt 
represents the dark spread for coal-generated power and the spark spread for gas-generated 
power. 
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Like most price series, power price data exhibit serial correlation. Hence, the error term εt is 
characterised by a so-called I(0) process (integrated of order zero).10  
 
1t t tuε ρε −= + ,        (3) 
 
where ut is a purely random variable with an expected value of zero, i.e. E(ut ) = 0, and a 
constant variance over time, i.e., Var(ut) = σ2.  
 
In 2005, electricity forward contracts were traded at the German power exchange EEX only a 
limited number of days. For the remaining days a settlement price was reported based on the 
chief trader principle. This requires all chief traders to daily submit a spreadsheet with their 
evaluation of prices for more than 40 different contract types. It is unlikely that all contract 
types would be updated on a daily basis in commensurate with CO2 prices. Since the different 
protocols used by various companies reporting power prices are proprietary information, we 
do not posses such information and are unable to consider it in the estimation procedure. 
Thus, to illustrate the effect, we assume in the appendix that the reported prices are a 
weighted average over the prices during the previous days or weeks. This creates an error on 
the left hand side of the equation that we are estimating. This error creates a bias in the 
estimation of β1. 
 
This bias exists if we estimate β1 using an ordinary least square estimation, but can increase 
significantly if we are estimating a non-cointegrated process based on (3) using other 
                                                 
10  An I(0) (integrated of order zero) is an autoregressive process with one period of lag, i.e., AR(1) and with a 
propensity factor |ρ|<1 (see equation (3)) (Stewart and Wallis, 1981). It indicates a process of correlation 
frequently experienced in every day’s life. For instance, if the ambient temperature was high yesterday and 
there are no major changes in the weather conditions, the temperature today should be more or less similar. 
In a case, the temperature today provides a prior belief from which tomorrow’s temperature can be inferred. 
Statistically, when assuming εt an I(0) process (i.e., |ρ|<1) in equation (3), the series is at least weakly 
independent. Therefore, both PW and OLS will be adequate to estimate pass-through rates given the correct 
specification. However, we are aware of the possibility of a non-cointegration process since three series – 
power prices, fuel costs and CO2 costs – follow an I(1) process based on Dickey-Fuller Test. Thus, in this 
paper, we intend to provide a preliminary assessment of the empirical CO2 pass through rates.  
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approaches that iteratively determine both β1 and ρ. The alternative approach we would 
usually apply in such a situation is an estimation based on the first differences. But once again 
we show in the appendix that the error on the left hand side of the equation can create a very 
strong bias in this estimation.  
 
Hence, we conclude that the least affected alternative is a simple OLS estimator. We accept 
that we have an estimator that might slightly underestimate the CO2 pass through. We are 
somewhat concerned about the fact that price series are typically auto-correlated. In fact, both 
power prices and CO2 costs series are I(1) processes. Thus, if CO2 and electricity price series 
are not also cointegrated, then the error terms follow an I(1) process and will fail to converge 
to zero. However, since both forward electricity prices and CO2 prices are bounded, it turns 
out to be less of an issue in our analyses. Finally, we know that the typical confidence 
intervals reported by our estimation will no longer appropriately represent the uncertainty in 
the estimation. Therefore, we apply bootstrapping to illustrate the accuracy of our estimation. 
In particular, we estimate β1 using the data from a restricted observation period, thus we can 
examine the robustness of the estimation. More specifically, we first construct a subset of data 
by bootstrapping samples from a window of a two-month period (e.g., January-February). 
Then, we run our regression based on the combined data from the bootstrapped subset data 
and from the remaining months (e.g., March-December). We repeat this process by sliding the 
two-month window (e.g., March-April, May-June, etc.), resulting in a total of six regressions 
with bootstrapped data.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the estimated CO2 pass through rates in Germany and the Netherlands 
and also gives the maximum and minimum of the OLS estimator associated with various 
bootstrapping estimations.  With confidence of about 80 percent, we can say that these rates 
are within the interval of 60 and 117 percent in Germany, and between 64 and 81 percent in 
the Netherlands. In light of the aforementioned methodological difficulties, the results 
presented in Table 1 need to be interpreted and treated with caution. In particular, we offer 
some explanations of possible complexities and discuss the potential direction of bias:  
 
Table 1 Empirical estimates of CO2 pass through rates in Germany and the Netherlands for the period 
January-December 2005, based on year ahead prices for 2006 (in %) 
Country Load period Fuel (efficiency) OLS Bootstrap (2 months) 
    min max 
Germany Peak  Coal (40%) 117 97 117 
 Off-peak Coal (40%) 60 60 71 
Netherlands Peak Gas (42%) 78 64 81 
 Off-peak Coal (40%) 80 69 80 
 
First, the very high pass through rate for Germany might partially be explained by increasing 
gas prices during 2005. Given that gas generators (instead of coal generators) set the marginal 
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price in Germany markets during some peak hours, this could contribute to power prices 
increase in peak forward contracts. As coal generators benefit from this gas cost-induced 
increase in power prices, it leads to an overestimate of the pass through rate of CO2 costs for 
coal-generated power. 
 
Finally, Sijm et al. (2005 and 2006) present and discuss a wide variety of further estimations 
of CO2 pass through rates. In general, the estimations based on the period January-July 2005 
result in lower pass through rates than estimations based on the period 2005 as a whole. For 
instance,  the pass through rate for the Netherlands peak hours is estimated at 38 percent for 
the period January-July 2005, while it is estimated at  78 percent for 2005 as a whole. This 
difference in estimated pass through rates between the period January-July and 2005 as a 
whole could possibly be caused by some delays in the market internalising the CO2 price (i.e. 
market learning), rapidly rising gas prices (notably during the first period of 2005), higher 
power prices due to increasing scarcity and/or market power (particularly during the latter part 
of 2005), or by various other factors affecting power prices in liberalised wholesale markets.  
 
Empirical estimate using the hourly spot markets in Germany 
Another approach to assess the impact of the CO2 allowance costs on the wholesale power 
price is to compare the day-ahead electricity prices per hour on the German power exchange 
(EEX for every day in 2005 with the corresponding prices in 2004). The implicit assumption 
is that factors other than CO2 and fuel costs remain unchanged during these two years. 
According to equation (4), the difference in the electricity price during a certain hour after the 
introduction of the ETS and the corresponding hour in 2004 is explained by the difference in 
coal prices during the hours concerned, the impact of the CO2 price on the EUA market and 
by an error term.  
 
2
2005, 2004, 2005, 2004,5 2005,β ε− = − + +coal coal cot t t t tp p p p p      (4) 
 
We set 2,
co
tp to reflect the costs of CO2 emissions at the daily allowance price for a coal power 
station with an emission rate of 0.9 tCO2/MWh. As coal is at the margin during most of the 
day, this can then also be interpreted as the work-on rate for coal power stations. 
 
Figure 7 depicts β for different hours of the day. We have split the observation period in three 
sections, mainly to examine whether the daily pattern is consistent over time. While this 
pattern did not change during the day, the level of work on rate increased for each subsequent 
period considered. 
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Figure 7 Work-on rate of CO2 costs on the German spot power market for different time periods, 
assuming coal generators  are at the margin 
 
The figure invites three observations. First, during off-peak periods the work-on rate seems to 
be lower than one. This could be partially explained by intertemporal constraints of power 
stations – they prefer to operate during off-peak periods if this saves start up costs. As CO2 
costs increase the start up costs, they also create additional incentives to lower prices during 
off-peak periods to retain the station running (Muesgens and Neuhoff, 2006). Second, if coal 
generators set the price during peak periods, then these are usually vintage stations with 
higher heat rates and therefore higher emission costs. Finally, the increase of gas prices during 
the year 2005-2006 is likely to also explain some of the price increase during peak periods. 
As spinning cycle gas turbines might be called during some peak periods, their increased 
costs with higher gas prices can further push up the power price.  
 
Therefore we now focus on the hour 3-4 pm for which intertemporal effects and the gas-price 
impact from peaking units running at maximum a few hours a day is least prevalent, as 
indicated by the lower value for this hour relative to other peak hours in Figure 7. Figure 8 
depicts for each day the price increase of electricity in the hour 3-4 pm relative to the pre-ETS 
year 2004. The curves are again corrected for coal prices and therefore de facto 
depict: 2005, 2004, 2005, 2004,5( )− − −
coal coal
t t tp p p p . 
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Figure 8 Coal price corrected price increase for electricity (3-4 pm) depicted as dots and their 40day 
moving average (volatile line) and the evolution of the CO2  price 
 
As can be noted in Figure 8, during January not the entire CO2 price was passed through, but 
subsequently a close link seems to exist between the increase of the CO2 cost and the increase 
of the electricity price relative to 2004. In September the public debate in Germany evolved 
about whether the inclusion of CO2 opportunity costs into the electricity price is appropriate, 
and induced generation companies to exercise with some caution. It seems that eventually 
power firms’ management took the position that any other behaviour than profit maximisation 
is inappropriate, and publicly acknowledged such behaviour, thus allowing traders to return to 
the habit of fully internalising the CO2 opportunity costs.  
 
By the end of the year 2005 the German electricity prices further increased. We did not 
analyse the reasons for this development. The price increase could be attributed to one of the 
following three factors, (i) scarcity of generation capacity, (ii) higher gas prices than in 
previous winters, thus higher prices when gas is at the margin, and (iii) the exercise of market 
power. 
 
Looking at the overall picture suggests that market participants in Germany have fully passed 
through the opportunity costs of CO2 allowances in the spot market.  
 
 17
4. Model estimates of CO2 cost pass through 
In addition to the empirical estimates, CO2 cost pass through rates have been estimated for 
some EU countries by means of the model COMPETES.11 COMPETES is basically a model 
to simulate and analyse the impact of strategic behaviour of large producers on the wholesale 
market under different market structure scenarios (varying from perfect competition to 
oligopolistic and monopolistic market conditions). The model has been used to analyse the 
implications of CO2 emissions trading for power prices, firm profits and other issues related 
to the wholesale power market in four countries of continental North-western Europe (i.e. 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands).  
 
The major findings of the COMPETES model with regard to CO2 cost pass through are 
summarised in Table 2. They are compared to model results from the Investment Planning 
Model (IPM), which are described in more detail in Neuhoff et al. (2006). As results are very 
sensitive to the gas/coal shift, small differences in the assumptions about gas prices, available 
gas generation capacity and interconnection capacity can explain the differences between both 
models results for the Netherlands. 
  
Under all scenarios considered, power prices turn out to increase significantly due to CO2 
emissions trading. In case of a CO2 price of 20 €/tonne, these increases are generally highest 
in Germany (13-19 €/MWh) with an intermediate position for Belgium (2-14 €/MWh) and the 
Netherlands (9-11 €/MWh). The model predicts very low price increases for France (1-5 
€/MWh), which reflects the predominant nuclear generation basis of this country.  
 
Table 2  Model estimates of electricity price increases (in €/MWh) due to CO2 costs at 20 €/t  
 Belgium France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom 
 
COMPETES 
 
2-14 
 
 
1-5 
 
13-19 
 
9-11 
 
 
 
IPM 
 
 
 
  
17 
 
15 
 
13-14 
 
 
Differences in absolute amounts of CO2 cost pass through between the individual countries 
considered can be mainly attributed to differences in fuel mix between these countries. For 
instance, during most of the load hours, power prices in Germany are set by a coal-fired 
                                                 
11  COMPETES stands for COmprehensive Market Power in Electricity Transmission and Energy Simulator. 
This model has been developed by ECN in cooperation with Benjamin F. Hobbs, Professor in the Whiting 
School of Engineering of The Johns Hopkins University (Department of Geography and Environmental 
Engineering, Baltimore, Maryland, USA). For more details on this model, see Sijm et al. (2005) and 
references cited there, as well as website http://www.electricitymarkets.info.  
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generator (with a high CO2 emission factor). On the other hand, in France they are often 
determined by a nuclear plant (with zero CO2 emissions), while the Netherlands take an 
intermediate position - in terms of average CO2 emissions and absolute cost pass through - 
due to the fact that Dutch power prices are set by a gas-fired installation during a major part 
of the load duration curve. 
 
In relative terms, i.e. as a percentage of the full opportunity costs of EU emissions trading, 
COMPETES has generated a wide variety of pass through rates for various scenarios and load 
periods analysed. While some of these rates are low (or even zero in case the power price is 
set by a nuclear plant), most of them vary between 60 and 80 percent, depending on the 
country, market structure, demand elasticity, load period and CO2 price considered. In 
general, these model estimates of CO2 cost pass through are higher than the empirical 
estimates for the forward power markets in Germany and the Netherlands, as discussed above 
(but lower than the empirical estimate for the German spot market).  
 
In addition, Table 2 provides the results of simulation runs by the Integrated Planning Model 
(IPM), a detailed power sector model for the EU developed by ICF Consulting. At a price of 
20 €/tCO2, the average amount of CO2 cost pass through in the UK is estimated at 13-14 
€/MWh, while for Germany and the Netherlands this amount is estimated at 17 and 15 
€/MWh, respectively.12  
 
5. Estimates of windfall profits 
As COMPETES includes detailed information at the operational level for all (major) power 
companies in the countries covered by the model, it can also be used to estimate the impact of 
emissions trading on firms’ profits at the aggregated level as well as at the level of major 
individual companies. Such quantitative results are helpful to understand the qualitative 
impact, but the numbers should only be taken as an indication of the order of magnitude 
involved. We will further discuss this aspect at the end of the section. 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the changes in total firms’ profits due to emissions trading 
under two scenarios, i.e. perfect competition (PC) and oligopolistic competition, i.e. strategic 
behaviour by the major power producers (ST). These ET-induced profit changes can be 
distinguished into two categories: 
1. Changes in profits due to ET-induced changes in production costs and power prices. This 
category of profit changes is independent of the allocation method. Actually, the 
                                                 
12  The high estimate for the Netherlands (compared to a similar estimate by the COMPETES model) might be 
caused by the older nature of the IPM model with coal having a stronger influence on power prices. 
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estimation of this category of profit changes is based on the assumption that all companies 
have to buy their allowances and, hence, that CO2 costs are ‘real’ costs. 
2. Changes in profits due to the free allocation of emission allowances. Actually, this 
category of profit changes is an addition or correction to the first category for the extent to 
which allowances are grandfathered - rather than sold - to eligible companies. 
 
Table 3 Changes in aggregated power firms’ profits due to CO2 emissions trading in Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, based on COMPETES model scenarios 
Scenarioa Price 
elasticity 
Total 
profits 
Change in profits due to: 
   price 
effects 
 
free  
allocation 
Total change in profits 
due to emissions 
trading 
  [M€] [M€] [M€] [M€] [%]
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
PC0-ze 0.0 13919   
PC20-ze 0.0 27487 5902 7666 13567 98
PC0 0.2 13919   
PC20 0.2 21904 1712 6272 7984 57
        
ST0-le 0.1 53656   
ST20-le 0.1 59570 -82 5996 5914 11
ST0 0.2 32015      
ST20 0.2 36782 -542 5308 4767 15
a)  PC and ST refer to two different model scenarios, i.e. perfect competition (PC) and oligopolistic (or strategic) 
competition (ST). Numbers attached to these abbreviations, such as PC0 or PC20, indicate a scenario without emissions 
trading (CO2 price is 0) versus a scenario with emissions trading (at a price of 20 €/tCO2). The additions 'ze' and ' le' 
refer to a zero price elasticiy and low price elasticiy (0.1), respectively, compared to the baseline scenario with a price 
elasticity of 0.2 
 
We start with the analysis of the impact of a perfectly competitive environment. In the fourth 
column of Table 3, it is assumed that all firms have to buy all their emissions allowances on 
the market, i.e. there are no windfall profits due to grandfathering. Even under this condition, 
total firm profits increase in the perfect competition scenarios. This results from the fact that, 
on average, power prices are set by marginal units with relatively high carbon intensities that 
pass their relatively high carbon costs through to these prices. Infra-marginal units with 
relatively low carbon intensities are not faced by these high carbon costs but benefit from the 
higher power prices on the market. Profits increase by € 6 billion if we assume no demand 
response, and by € 2 billion if we assume a very strong demand response of 0.2.13  Thus, the 
high demand elasticity scenarios (i.e., 0.1 and 0.2) provide a lower bound estimation of 
windfall profits. Note, that in the long term investment equilibrium we expect a fixed ratio 
between demand and the number of power stations, and hence a reduction of demand will not 
                                                 
13  This implies an increase of the wholesale price level from 20 €/MWh to 30 €/MWh, and hence of the retail 
price level (including transmission, distribution and marketing costs) from lets say 70 €/MWh to 90 €/MWh, 
would result in a reduction of demand by 10 percent. 
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affect profitability of individual power stations. The total profits of power generators are 
obviously further increased if we consider the impact of the free allocation (column 5), as is 
illustrated in column (6).  
 
The model provides additional insights into the impact of strategic behaviour of power 
generators. If we assume power generators act strategically, then they will push up prices and, 
therefore, their profits already double in the reference case that ignores emission trading. It 
would be subject to further empirical work to assess to what extent this level of profits 
corresponds to the situation before the introduction of emission trading. If we now introduce 
emission trading into the model scenarios, then profitability in the absence of free allocation 
is slightly reduced (by less than 1%). While all generators profit from the higher prices, the 
effect of a smaller market dominates this effect and therefore slightly reduces their revenues. 
 
COMPETES is based on the assumption of a linear demand function which implies a lower 
rate of passing through under oligopolisitic competition than that in competitive markets. If 
constant elasticity of demand supply were assumed in the model, then higher pass through 
rates than competitive markets would result. These lower pass through rates in the case of 
oligopolistic competition explain why profits due to emissions trading (excluding free 
allocation) are slightly reduced in the ST scenarios. Note, however, that due to strategic 
behaviour, profits in the reference ST scenario are significantly higher than in the CP 
scenario. Free allocation (column 5) once again makes all scenarios very profitable for power 
industry (column 6).  
 
Under the present EU ETS, however, companies do not have to buy their emission allowances 
on the market but receive them largely for free. This implies that they are able to realise 
windfall profits due to grandfathering as they still pass on the carbon costs of grandfathered 
emission allowances. The fifth column of Table 3 shows estimates of these profits, based on 
estimates of total firms CO2 emissions and the assumption that power companies receive, on 
average, 90 percent of the allowances to cover their emissions for free. At a price of an 
emission allowance of € 20/tCO2, these windfall profits vary between € 5.3 and 7.7 billion, 
depending on the scenario considered. As total production and total emissions are generally 
higher under the competitive scenarios (because companies do not exercise their market 
power to withdraw output), total windfall profits due to grandfathering are also higher under 
these scenarios (compared to the oligopolistic scenarios based on strategic behaviour).  
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Table 4  Changes in profits of individual power companies operating in Belgium, France, Germany and 
the Netherlands, based on two COMPETES model scenarios (in M€) 
 
Perfect competition (PC) 
         Total profits 
 
Change in profits due to: 
 
 PC0 PC20-ze 
price 
effects 
free 
allocation 
Total 
change 
in 
profits 
Comp Nationale du Rhone 127 154 28 0 28 
Comp Belgium 204 340 84 51 135 
Comp France 200 326 7 119 126 
Comp Germany 743 2119 147 1230 1376 
Comp Netherlands 128 172 -22 66 44 
E.ON  2007 4575 1517 1051 2568 
Electrabel 1722 2883 625 536 1161 
Electricité de France (EdF) 4405 6807 2178 225 2402 
ENBW 768 1890 748 373 1122 
ESSENT  319 535 -42 257 216 
NUON  204 261 -90 148 57 
RWE Power 1861 4565 802 1902 2704 
Soc. Production d’Elec (SPE) 52 92 13 27 41 
STEAG AG 217 438 -25 245 220 
Vattenfall Europe 962 2329 -69 1436 1367 
Total 13919 27487 5902 7666 13567 
 
Oligopolistic competition (ST) 
        Total profits 
 
Change in profits due to: 
 
 ST0 ST20 
price 
effects 
free 
allocation 
Total 
change 
in 
profits 
Comp Nationale du Rhone 425 433 8 0 8 
Comp Belgium 250 269 -60 80 20 
Comp France 1576 1422 -472 317 -155 
Comp Germany 1972 2997 -319 1344 1025 
Comp Netherlands 392 469 -59 136 77 
E.ON  3269 4226 757 199 956 
Electrabel 2775 3220 245 199 445 
Electricité de France (EdF) 12287 12709 323 98 422 
ENBW 1646 2182 330 205 536 
ESSENT  775 923 -99 247 147 
NUON  650 620 -195 166 -29 
RWE POWER 2896 3245 -119 468 349 
Soc. Production d’Elec (SPE) 339 348 -51 60 9 
STEAG AG 658 1001 -196 539 343 
Vattenfall Europe 2103 2718 -636 1251 615 
Total 32015 36782 -542 5308 4767 
a)  PC and ST refer to two different model scenarios, i.e. perfect competition (PC) and oligopolistic (or strategic) 
competition (ST). Numbers attached to these abbreviations, such as PC0 or PC20, indicate a scenario without emissions 
trading (CO2 price is 0) versus a scenario with emissions trading (at a price of 20 €/tCO2). The additions 'ze' and ' le' 
refer to a zero price elasticiy and low price elasticiy (0.1), respectively, compared to the baseline scenario with a price 
elasticity of 0.2 
 
 
There are major differences, however, in profit performance due to emissions trading at the 
individual firm level, as can be noticed from Table 4. This table presents changes in profits 
due to emissions trading under two scenarios - PC20-ze and ST20 - for the major power 
companies covered by COMPETES, including the so-called ‘competitive fringe’ of these 
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countries.14 In general, when excluding windfall profits due to grandfathering, companies 
such as E.ON and EdF seem to benefit most from emissions trading, especially from the 
increase in power prices due to the pass-through of carbon costs (i.e., type 1 windfall profits). 
This is not surprising given the high share of nuclear production in total generation by these 
companies.  
 
On the other hand, some companies make a loss due to emissions trading when they have to 
buy their emissions allowances. In both scenarios, these companies are particularly ESSENT, 
NUON, STEAG AG and Vattenfall Europe. The losses for ESSENT and NUON are mainly 
due to the fact that these Dutch companies loose market shares in favour of foreign, less 
carbon intensive companies, while they hardly benefit from ET-induced price increases in the 
Dutch market as these are matched by similar increases in CO2 costs of gas-fired, price-
setting power stations. The losses for STEAG AG and Vattenfall Europe are predominantly 
due to their portfolio mix. For STEAG AG, this portfolio is purely based on coal, while a 
large component of Vattenfall’s portfolio is based on brown coal. Brown coal is more carbon 
intensive than Germany electricity price setting coal. This unbalanced portfolio is reflected in 
profit losses in the absence of free allowance allocation. 
 
Once the windfall profits due to grandfathering are accounted for, however, all companies 
realise additional profits due to emissions trading under both scenarios mentioned in Table 4. 
As coal- and other carbon-intensive companies (such as RWE, STEAG AG and Vattenfall 
Europe) receive relatively large amounts of CO2 emission allowances for free, they benefit 
relatively most from this effect of emissions trading on firms’ profits.  
 
Although the above-mentioned quantitative estimates of changes in windfall profits are 
helpful to understand the qualitative impact of the EU ETS on the profitability of power 
generation at the firm level, they have to be judged in light of the restrictions of the modelling 
approach:  
 
First, it is a static model which, therefore, does not capture the impact on investment decisions 
or, alternatively, the restraint of the potential threat of entrants or regulatory intervention put 
on power generators to keep prices down. In the long run, new investment is required, and 
therefore the best estimate for long-term power prices is the cost of entry of a new generator. 
This model therefore provides insights into the profitability during the transition period when 
emission trading is implemented, but the structure of generation assets has not adjusted to 
                                                 
14  The competitive fringe of a country - denoted as Comp_Belgium, Comp_France, etc, - refers to the 
collections of (smaller) producers in a country that lack the ability to influence power prices due to their 
small market share and, therefore, they were modelled behaving competitively (i.e. as price takers). 
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reflect the new optimal investment mix. Thus we see this analysis as a guide towards 
understanding the type of compensation that power generators can expect in the transition 
period before we shift towards a new equilibrium. 
 
Second, the model scenarios of strategic behaviour tend to capture qualitative effects, but the 
quantification typically requires stronger assumptions. For example market design of 
transmission or balancing markets can have significant impact on opportunities to exercise 
market power by strategic players.  
 
Third, in the strategic model scenarios we assume a linear demand function. With linear 
demand functions strategic firms reduce the CO2 cost pass through relative to the competitive 
model scenarios. Analytic work shows that this result is inverted if we instead assume a 
constant elasticity of demand function. In this case strategic firms increase the CO2 pass 
through rate relative to a competitive scenario. But, we believe the empirical demand curves 
would be somewhere between two extreme cases: constant elasticity and linear demand (i.e., 
zero elasticity). Furthermore, given the fact that all economic rent from introducing EU ETS 
goes to producers (at the expense of consumers) under fixed demand scenarios, the 
profitability of firms under constant elasticity cases would be less than that under liner 
demand cases in general.   
 
Estimates of windfall profits in the Netherlands 
Recently, Frontier Economics (2006) has estimated windfall profits due to the EU ETS for the 
four largest power companies operating in the Netherlands (i.e. ESSENT, NUON, E.ON and 
Electrabel). For the year 2005, these profits are estimated at € 19 mln for the four companies 
as a whole. This estimate is rather low as it is based on some stringent, specific assumptions 
and conditions for the year 2005. On the one hand, it is assumed that 90 percent of the power 
produced during 2005 was already sold in 2003 and 2004, when CO2 prices and (assumed) 
pass through rates were low, resulting in additional revenues of power sales in 2005 of € 69 
mln. On the other hand, it is assumed that the ‘allocation deficit’ of the four companies - i.e. 
the difference between the allowances grandfathered and the allowances needed to cover their 
emissions - was met by market purchases in 2005 only, when CO2 prices were high, resulting 
in a total cost of € 50 mln.15 Overall, the net benefits or windfall profits for the four major 
power companies operating in the Netherlands is estimated at € 19 mln in 2005. 
 
                                                 
15  However, in May 2006, when the verified emissions of the four companies were published , it turned out that 
these companies did not have an allocation deficit but rather a small surplus. This implies that the estimate of 
the windfall profits by Frontier Economics was indeed quite conservative as actually it is at least € 50 million 
higher.  
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Although the estimate by Frontier Economics of the windfall profits in the Netherlands (and 
the underlying assumptions and conditions) can, to some extent, be justified for the year 2005, 
it does not provide an adequate, ‘representative’ estimate of the windfall profits due to the EU 
ETS in the years thereafter. A more representative estimate of these windfall profits can be 
based on one of the following three approaches. 
 
Firstly, based on the COMPETES methodology outlined above, changes in profits due to CO2 
emissions trading have been estimated for the operations of the four largest power companies 
in the Netherlands in an ‘average’ year. Table 5 shows that, at a price of 20 €/tCO2, these 
changes vary between  € 250 and 600 mln for the four companies as a whole, depending on 
the scenario considered. As explained, these changes are the result of two different effects of 
emissions trading, called the price and grandfathering effects. As can be observed from Table 
5, the price effect - based on the assumption that power companies have to buy all their 
emission allowances - leads to substantial losses in 3 out of 4 scenarios. This is due to the fact 
that (i) the share of non-carbon power generation in the Netherlands is relatively low (and, 
hence, the benefits of ET-induced price increases for non-carbon generators are low), and (ii) 
the share of gas-fired power generation - setting the power price - is relatively high in the 
Netherlands (and, hence, high-carbon generators such as coal-fired installations are faced by 
high carbon costs that are not matched by equally higher power prices).  
 
Table 5 Changes in aggregated profits due to CO2 emissions trading for the four largest power firms in 
the Netherlands (E.ON, Electrabel, ESSENT and NUON), based on COMPETES model 
scenarios 
Scenario Price 
elasticity 
Total 
profits 
Change in profits due to: 
   price 
effects 
free 
allocation 
Total change in profits 
due to emissions 
trading 
  [M€] [M€] [M€] [M€] [%]
PC0  995      
PC20 0.2 1394 -78 477 399 40
PC20-ze 0.0 1580 109 477 585 59
        
ST0  2151      
ST20 0.2 2408 -179 436 257 12
ST20-le 0.1 3359   
ST20-le 0.1 3610 -185 436 251 7
a)  PC and ST refer to two different model scenarios, i.e. perfect competition (PC) and oligopolistic (or strategic) 
competition (ST). Numbers attached to these abbreviations, such as PC0 or PC20, indicate a scenario without emissions 
trading (CO2 price is 0) versus a scenario with emissions trading (at a price of 20 €/tCO2). The additions 'ze' and ' le' 
refer to a zero price elasticiy and low price elasticiy (0.1), respectively, compared to the baseline scenario with a price 
elasticity of 0.2 
 
On the other hand, when assuming that the power companies in the Netherlands receive 90 
percent of their needed emission allowances for free, the grandfathering effect far outweighs 
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the price effect, resulting in major total windfall profits due to emissions trading based largely 
on free allocation. It can be estimated that if the share of grandfathering in total allowances 
needed by the four major power companies operating in the Netherlands would be reduced 
from 90 to 40 percent, they would still realize a windfall profit due to emissions trading in all 
scenarios considered in Table 5. 
 
Secondly, following the methodology used by Frontier Economics for an average, 
‘representative’ year, it may - for instance - be assumed that (i) total CO2 emissions of the 
four major power companies in the Netherlands is about 37.5 MtCO2 per year, while the 
amount of allowances grandfathered to these companies is 35 MtCO2 per annum (hence, the 
allocation deficit is 2.5 MtCO2 per year, i.e. about 7 percent of total emissions), (ii) the price 
of a CO2 allowance bought is, on average, equal to the price of a CO2 allowance passed 
through to power prices, and amounts to 20 €/tCO2, and (iii) the average pass through rate is 
50 percent. In that case, the total windfall profits of the four major power companies in the 
Netherlands amounts to € 325 mln. 
 
Finally, the third approach to estimate windfall profits is based on ET-induced price increases 
of domestically produced power sales in the Netherlands. These sales amount to some 100 
TWh per year. Assuming that (i) 75 percent of this volume is sold during peak hours and the 
remaining part during the off-peak, (ii) that during peak hours power prices are set by a gas-
fired installation with an emission factor of 0.4 tCO2/MWh and during the off-peak by a coal-
fired plant with an emission factor of 0.8 tCO2/MWh, (iii) the CO2 price is, on average, 20 €/t, 
(iv) the average pass through rate is 40 percent during the peak and 50 percent during the off-
peak, and (v) the allocation deficit for the power sector as a whole is equivalent to 4 mln tCO2 
per year. In that case, the total windfall profits amount to € 360 mln per year.16 
 
To conclude, at a price of 20 €/tCO2, estimates of windfall profits due to the EU ETS in the 
power sector of the Netherlands for an average, ‘representative’ year vary between € 300-500 
mln. This compares to about half the value of the emission allowances grandfathered to the 
power sector or some 3-5 €/MWh produced in the Netherlands.17 It should be emphasized, 
however, that these estimates ignore the impact of ETS-induced profit changes on new 
investments in generation capacity and, hence, on production costs, power prices and firm 
profits in the long run towards a new equilibrium.  
                                                 
16  This figure includes not only the windfall profits of the four largest power companies in the Netherlands but 
also of all other Dutch power producers benefiting from ET-induced increased in the price of electricity.  
17  Note that in the Netherlands the share of non-carbon fuels in total power production is low and that power 
prices are usually set by carbon-fuelled installations, notably gas-fired plants. In countries where the share of 
non-carbon fuels is much higher or where power prices are set by either high carbon-fuelled (i.e. coal) 
installations or by a non-carbon fuelled generator, the windfall profit per MWh or allowance grandfathered 
may be substantially different than in the Netherlands.  
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6. Summary of major findings and policy implications 
This paper shows that, in theory, power producers pass on the opportunity costs of freely 
allocated emission allowances to the price of electricity. For a variety of reasons, however, the 
increase in power prices on the market may be less than the increase in CO2 costs per MWh 
generated by the marginal production unit. This is confirmed by empirical and model 
findings, showing estimates of CO2 cost pass through rates varying between 40 and 100 
percent for wholesale power markets in countries of North-western Europe. In absolute 
amounts, these rates imply that, at a CO2 price of 20 €/t, ET-induced increases in power prices 
range between 3 and 18 €/MWh, depending on the carbon intensity of the price-setting 
installation. As most of the emission allowances needed are allocated for free, the profitability 
of power generation increases accordingly. Model and empirical estimates of additional 
profits due to the EU ETS show that these ‘windfall profits’ may be very significant, 
depending on the price of CO2 and the assumptions made. For instance, at a CO2 price of 20 
€/t, ETS-induced windfall profits in the power sector of the Netherlands are estimated at € 
300-500 mln per year, i.e. about € 3-5 per MWh produced and sold in the Netherlands. 
 
In order to reduce the windfall profits, an increasing part of the allowances available for the 
power sector should be auctioned, starting from the second phase of the EU ETS (2008-
2012),. While auctioning would raise power prices by the costs of the CO2 allowances, it 
would have several beneficial effects, including (i) avoiding windfall profits among 
producers, (ii) enhancing environmental-economic efficiencies by internalising the external 
costs of CO2 emissions into the power price, (iii) raising public revenues that could be used to 
mitigate potential drawbacks of rising power prices, and (iv) treating incumbents and 
newcomers equally while avoiding potential distortions of new investment decisions.  
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Appendix 1.  Biased estimation of pass through rate if frequency of estimation is higher 
than frequency of observation of forward electricity prices 
 
While EEX offers daily clearing prices for the forward prices, these are typically not based on 
trades but on averages of the survey results among various traders. Given that each chief 
trader is expected to submit daily an updated price prediction on 40 contract types, it is 
unlikely that she will update this prediction daily, and hence the daily prices overstate the 
information content of the data.  
 
This note attempts to understand why a delay in observing the forward electricity price tp , 
results in a bias in the estimation b  of the pass through rate r . Let’s assume that electricity 
prices are formed according to: 
 
  ttt ercp +=  with te  iid ,      (1) 
 
 but we can only observe tq  with 
 
   
2
1−+
=
tt
t
pp
q .      (2) 
 
This reflects that trading volume is limited with only trades on a few days. In the absence of 
trades, the power exchange asks traders to report their best guess of trades and uses the 
average reported prices. However, traders only infrequently update their reports; hence the 
reported price is an average of the real price over various periods. How does this effect the 
estimation b  of the pass though rate? We estimate: 
 
   ttt bcq η+=        (3) 
 
1. OLS estimation 
 
First, assume we use OLS, and therefore chose b  to minimise ∑t t2η  
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2. AR(1) estimation 
 
Second, assume we estimate using an AR(1) process with ttt p γηη += −1  with tγ  iid. 
We minimise 
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Using like always the first order condition 
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3. Quantification of bias 
 
We use the CO2 prices from January-December 2005 as input for tc  and calculate the bias in 
the estimated pass through rate at the example of a time lag of 20 days. This reflects the 
delays in updating under the chief trade principle applied to determine the contract settlement 
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prices. The OLS creates a bias of 2%. Figure 1 presents the bias that results if the AR(1) 
process is assumed, depicted for different values of ρ  
 
An AR(1) process is usually estimated in an iterative two-stage procedure. In this case the 
biased estimator for b  will result in a wrong estimation of the error term, thus influencing the 
estimation of ρ , which in turn feeds back to the next estimation of b . Hence the effect might 
be further distorted. This analysis suggests that the OLS estimator will provide a less biased 
estimation of the pass through rate b  than AR estimation. This is caused because rather than 
p, the underlying forward price, only a time averaged q is available for the estimation. 
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Figure A.1 Bias in estimated pass through rate  
 
4. Cointegration 
 
We note that both approaches fail to address an aspect that is typically present in commodity 
price data: they are autocorrelated. If forward prices and CO2 prices are not cointegrated, then 
error terms under both estimations might not converge. The typical response is to run an 
estimation using the first differences. This is typically a successful approach in the case of not 
cointegrated AR(1) processes (but does not have the quick convergence properties that 
otherwise characterise estimations using levels).  
 
However, once again the price formation process precludes such attempt for the daily forward 
prices. Lets define 1−−= ttt ccdc  and likewise for tdq  and tdp . As above we would estimate: 
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This suggests that given the price formation, a first difference estimation using daily price 
data will bias the estimation of b significant downward. One possible alternative approach 
would be to use monthly average prices, but then the number of observation points is reduced. 
 
